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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 32 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1284 (1999)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the implementation of paragraphs 15 to 30 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999 is submitted to the Security Council pursuant to the request contained in paragraph 32 of that resolution (hereafter referred to as the resolution).

II. SALE AND EXPORT OF PETROLEUM AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS BY IRAQ

2. In paragraph 15 of the resolution, the Security Council authorized States, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 3 (a), 3 (b) and 4 of resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions, to permit the import of any volume of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, including financial and other essential transactions relating thereto, as required for the purposes set out in paragraph 1 (a) and (b) of resolution 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995 and related resolutions.

3. Since the adoption of the resolution on 17 December 1999, and as at 11 January 2000, the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) has approved 68 oil contracts, involving purchasers from 31 countries. The total quantity of oil approved for export under those contracts corresponds to approximately 209 million barrels, with an estimated value of $4,767 million, at current prices.

4. As at 11 January 2000, 36 loadings, totalling 45.5 million barrels, with an estimated value of $1,033 million, have been completed at Mina al-Bakr in Iraq and Ceyhan in Turkey.

5. Taking into account the requirements for the preparation of the reports requested in paragraphs 28 and 30 of the resolution, I am dispatching a group of experts, including oil industry experts, to Iraq from 16 to 31 January 2000. The duration of the mission of the group of experts may be extended, as necessary.

III. UNITED NATIONS ACCOUNTS PERTAINING TO THE IRAQ PROGRAMME

6. In paragraph 20 of the resolution, the Security Council decided to suspend, for an initial period of six months from the date of its adoption and subject to review, the implementation of paragraph 8 (g) of resolution 986 (1995). Subject to approval by the Security Council, the Secretariat will reallocate these funds to the ESB (53 per cent) account. This would raise the allocation percentage as set out in annex III of my report of 25 November 1996 (S/1996/978) of net oil proceeds for the ESB (53 per cent) account from 53.034 per cent to 54.034 per cent.

7. In paragraph 22 of the resolution, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to minimize the cost of United Nations activities associated with the implementation of resolution 986 (1995), as well as the cost of the independent inspection agents and certified public accountants appointed by him, in accordance with paragraphs 6 and 7 of resolution 986 (1995). The services of the independent inspection agents are secured in strict accordance with established United Nations international competitive bidding procedures which, inter alia, require that contracts are awarded to the lowest technically acceptable bidder. The certified public accountants are independently audited on a regular basis by the United Nations Board of Auditors and are also subject to the relevant financial rules and procedures of the United Nations. Furthermore, all activities associated with the implementation of resolution 986 (1995) are subject to regular budget reviews which seek to ensure that they are undertaken in the most cost-effective manner possible.

8. Pursuant to paragraph 23 of the resolution, since 21 December 1999, the Secretariat has provided the Government of Iraq with a daily statement of the status of the escrow account established by paragraph 7 of resolution 986 (1995). The statement provides a status report of the activity of the escrow account and a bank statement by the bank holding the Iraq account.

9. Pursuant to paragraph 24 of the resolution, the Office of the Iraq Programme has initiated a review to be undertaken by the United Nations Office for Project Services, in consultation with the Government of Iraq and all others concerned, with a view to assisting the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements, subject to Security Council approval, to allow funds deposited in the escrow account established by resolution 986 (1995) to be used for the purchase of locally produced goods. The review will also identify the requirements and conditions under which the necessary arrangements may be made to allow for those funds also to meet the local cost for essential civilian needs funded in accordance with the provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions, including, where appropriate, the cost of installation and training services.

10. Pursuant to paragraph 26 of the resolution, the Secretariat, in consultation with the Security Council Committee, is reviewing options to make possible the necessary arrangements, for approval by the Security Council, to provide for reasonable expenses related to the Hajj pilgrimage to be met by funds in the escrow account.

IV. PROCESSING AND APPROVAL OF APPLICATIONS FOR CONTRACTS

11. Pursuant to paragraph 17 of the resolution, the Office of the Iraq Programme, in consultation with United Nations agencies and programmes, as well as with the Government of Iraq, has drawn up lists of humanitarian items, including foodstuffs, pharmaceutical and medical supplies, as well as basic or standard medical and agricultural equipment and basic or standard educational items that, in accordance with the resolution, do not require submission to the Security Council Committee. The lists are currently being reviewed by technical experts to ensure that items subject to the provisions of resolution 1051 (1996) of 27 March 1996 are not included. Upon completion of this review, the lists will be submitted to the Security Council Committee for its approval in accordance with paragraph 17 of the resolution. The Office of the Iraq Programme, in consultation with all concerned, is also preparing procedures for the implementation of paragraph 17 of the resolution, which will also be submitted to the Committee for approval.

12. The Office of the Iraq Programme will provide all necessary assistance and information to the Security Council Committee in implementing the relevant provisions of paragraph 25 of the resolution. As requested in paragraph 25, the Security Council Committee will be notified, through the customs evaluation reports accompanying each application, of any items included in the list to which the export/import mechanism approved by resolution 1051 (1996) applies. The Security Council Committee will also be notified of all applications which include items subject to the provisions of resolution 1051 (1996) through the weekly reports prepared by the Office of the Iraq Programme.

13. In paragraph 18 of the resolution, the Security Council Committee is requested to appoint, in accordance with resolutions 1175 (1998) of 19 June 1998 and 1210 (1998) of 24 November 1998, a group of experts, including independent inspection agents appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 986 (1995). The Council decided that the group of experts will be mandated to expeditiously approve contracts for the parts and equipment necessary to enable Iraq to increase its exports of petroleum and petroleum based products, according to lists of parts and equipment approved by the Special Committee for each individual project. The Office of the Iraq Programme has brought to the attention of the Security Council Committee the draft guidelines prepared in July 1998 pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 1175 (1998), in which the Security Council requested the Committee, or a panel of experts appointed by that Committee, to approve contracts for oil spare parts and equipment, according to lists of parts and equipment approved by the Committee for each individual project, for the purpose of increasing the export by Iraq of petroleum and petroleum based products.

V. OBSERVATION AND MONITORING MECHANISMS

14. In paragraph 21 of the resolution, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General, inter alia, to continue to enhance the United Nations observation process in Iraq and to keep the Council informed of the steps taken towards the implementation of the provisions of that paragraph. The Office of the Iraq Programme is reviewing the United Nations observation process in Iraq

with a view to enhancing observation and reporting capacities. The review seeks, inter alia, to ensure the appointment of highly competent staff in the Geographical Observation Unit in Iraq, with relevant qualifications and backgrounds in order to improve the analytical nature of the reports provided to the Security Council and to maximize coordination between the Multidisciplinary and Geographical Observation Units and the sectoral observers of the United Nations agencies and programmes. The Office of the Iraq Programme is also preparing terms of reference for additional experts for the Multidisciplinary Observation Unit. The Council and its Committee will be kept informed on progress made in this regard on a regular basis.

15. The group of experts referred to in paragraph 5 above, have also been tasked to make recommendations regarding the current arrangements for monitoring oil spare parts and equipment inside Iraq with a view to enhancing the monitoring and reporting on the distribution and utilization of oil spare parts and equipment inside Iraq, as called for in paragraph 18 of the resolution.

VI. STEPS TAKEN TO MAXIMIZE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ARRANGEMENTS SET OUT IN RESOLUTION 986 (1995)

16. Pursuant to paragraph 21 of the resolution, the Office of the Iraq Programme will be looking into further ways of maximizing the effectiveness of the arrangements set out in resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions, including the humanitarian benefit to the Iraqi population in all areas of the country, and, to this end, will draw, as necessary, on the advice of specialists, including representatives of international humanitarian organizations.

VII. PROGRESS ON MEETING THE HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF THE IRAQI POPULATION

17. Pursuant to paragraph 28 of the resolution, I will submit to the Council a report on the progress made in meeting the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people and on the revenues necessary to meet those needs, including recommendations on necessary additions to the current allocation for oil spare parts and equipment, on the basis of a comprehensive survey of the condition of the Iraqi oil production sector.

18. Accordingly, the Office of the Iraq Programme, with the full participation of all the agencies and programmes of the United Nations system concerned, is currently reviewing the progress made in meeting the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people and on the revenues necessary to meet those needs. The terms of reference for the review have been shared with the Government of Iraq, whose participation in the review has been sought. In the preparation of the report to be submitted pursuant to paragraph 28 of the resolution, the report of the group of experts referred to in paragraph 5 above will be taken into account.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

19. The Council will be kept informed, as appropriate, on the measures taken by the Government of Iraq in implementing the provisions of paragraph 27 of resolution 1284 (1999).

20. In paragraph 19 of the resolution, the Security Council encouraged Member States and international organizations to provide supplementary humanitarian assistance and published material of an educational character to Iraq. It may be recalled that in my previous reports to the Security Council on the implementation of the humanitarian programme under resolution 986 (1995), I have repeatedly encouraged the international community to provide supplementary assistance in addition to and complementary to those provided under resolution 986 (1995). I regret that the response thus far has not been encouraging. I have directed the Office of the Iraq Programme to further pursue the matter, on my behalf.

21. On several occasions I have drawn attention to the numerous reports on the implementation of the humanitarian programme in Iraq that are being submitted to the Security Council and its Committee within short time-frames. In addition to the reports submitted to the Council every 90 days on the implementation of the humanitarian programme during a given phase and special reports, such as those on the list of oil spare parts and equipment, the Office of the Iraq Programme provides a monthly progress report to the Security Council Committee on the implementation of the programme, as well as a weekly report on the status of processing of applications and the estimated availability of funds. I should like to recommend a review in order to rationalize the number of reports. The rationalization of the number of reports required will also allow more time to the relatively modest number of United Nations personnel involved in the implementation of such a large and complex programme to concentrate on the implementation of the programme, both at Headquarters and in the field.

22. Accordingly, taking into account the number and schedule of the reports requested by the Security Council in the resolution, I should like to submit to the Council for its consideration a recommendation that the information and recommendations to be included in the reports requested in paragraphs 28 and 30 of the resolution be included in a single report to be submitted to the Council on 10 March 2000. Under the current schedule, the reports pursuant to paragraphs 28 and 30 are due on 15 February and 26 March 2000, respectively. I should also like to recommend for the consideration of the Council that the information to be provided in my 90-day report, due on 10 March 2000, pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1281 (1999), also be combined in the proposed single report. It is my opinion that such a single comprehensive report will also facilitate the work of the Council.

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE IN ANGOLA (UNOA)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 1268 (1999) of 15 October 1999, in which the Council, inter alia, requested me to provide every three months a report on developments in Angola, including recommendations about additional measures the Council might consider to promote the peace process. It covers developments since October 1999.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

2. In the last few months, the overall situation in Angola has seen a major change following the successful military campaign undertaken by the Government, which has resulted in re-establishing State authority in the vast territory previously occupied by the União National para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). The hostilities, which affected several regions of Angola, have continued to cause immense suffering for the Angolan people and the destruction of the country's infrastructure. The recent escalation of fighting into Namibia is also a major source of concern.

3. The Government has maintained the position that it does not consider Mr. Jonas Savimbi a credible partner for dialogue, given his record of not implementing his previous undertakings in good faith. At the same time, in a statement made on 11 November 1999, President José Eduardo dos Santos said that all Savimbi's supporters who surrendered to the government forces would be allowed to carry out political activities. He also stressed that the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex) was still a valid basis for the peace process in Angola, and he outlined a programme of action that would culminate in the holding of legislative and presidential elections. However, the dates for such elections were not announced.

4. In the meantime, the Government continued to reinforce its military action on the ground, as well as a campaign aimed at the political isolation of UNITA. To this effect, consultations were conducted by the Government with various countries, particularly those in the subregion, in an attempt to deny Mr. Savimbi lines of communication and logistic support. In this context,

several high-level meetings were held with the representatives of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia and Zambia, focusing on issues related to security along Angola's border; some important bilateral understandings and agreements have reportedly been reached in this regard.

5. In Luanda and some provincial capitals, the UNITA Restoration Committee (UNITA-Renovada) continued to be active, calling for the earliest termination of the conflict by Mr. Savimbi's group and urging his supporters to surrender or defect to the Government. In addition, UNITA-Renovada reiterated the need for the Government to resume the demobilization of UNITA fighters to be incorporated in the proposed "fourth branch" of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA).

6. Various political parties and church groups have also appealed for the earliest resumption of the national dialogue and a cessation of hostilities. To this effect, some political groups are calling for an inclusive multi-party conference, open to all major political figures without exclusion, in order to find a lasting solution to the Angolan conflict. The Catholic Church, which enjoys a large following in Angola, as well as other important non-governmental organizations, has also repeatedly urged UNITA to lay down its arms and appealed to the Government to seek a peaceful solution expeditiously. The Church has also offered its good offices, provided that both parties agree. Following President dos Santos's New Year's address indicating that the Government was open to dialogue with all "valid interlocutors", the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) called for the convening of a national forum in which all political parties would discuss the main problems affecting the country, as a starting point for a national dialogue.

7. Shortly after the adoption on 15 October 1999 of Security Council resolution 1268 (1999), I received a letter from the Minister of External Relations of Angola (S/1999/1099, annex), in which he reaffirmed his Government's position regarding the mandate of the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA). The Minister indicated that the new Office should serve as a liaison between the Government of Angola and the Secretary-General, with a view to ensuring a close follow-up of the situation in the country by the Council in matters related to humanitarian assistance, capacity-building and the strengthening of Angolan government institutions in the field of human rights. In my reply addressed to the Foreign Minister dated 11 November 1999, I took note of the Government's position and stressed that the substantive staff of the new Office would perform the functions outlined in Council resolution 1268 (1999). I also reaffirmed the readiness of the United Nations to contribute to the promotion of peace in the country and to regional security. At present, the Secretariat is still awaiting a reply from the Angolan Government on the latest version of the revised text of the Status-of-Mission Agreement (SOMA) for UNOA which was transmitted to the Foreign Minister on 17 December 1999. However, on 12 January 2000, UNOA was informed that the Council of Ministers Standing Committee, chaired by President dos Santos, had approved the Status-of-Mission Agreement and forwarded it to the National Assembly for approval.

8. The expert panel of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola visited Angola and other countries in southern Africa in October 1999 to discuss ways of improving

the implementation of the measures imposed against UNITA, contained in Council resolutions 864 (1993), 1127 (1997) and 1173 (1998). While in Angola, the panel held very useful discussions with government officials and relevant organizations. The Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Robert Fowler of Canada, arrived in Luanda on 8 January 2000 to consult with the Angolan authorities on the impact of sanctions against UNITA and discuss additional measures to strengthen the implementation of the sanctions regime.

9. In a separate development, the Secretary-General of UNITA, Lukamba Paulo "Gato", indicated in a press interview in November 1999 that the Russian crew members of an aircraft shot down by UNITA were alive and were being held hostage, and that UNITA would be prepared to release them on humanitarian grounds. The United Nations remains deeply concerned about the fate of those and other missing personnel in Angola and will continue to do everything possible to secure their earliest release.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

10. Following the general offensive launched by FAA in September 1999, the Government gradually re-established its authority in the central, northern and eastern regions where FAA had gained control of a number of key UNITA areas. UNITA's strongholds of Bailundo, Mungo, Andulo and N'harêa were captured in a decisive campaign. Recently, FAA made additional gains in the central highlands, in particular, securing control of Waku-Kungo locality (Cuanza Sul province) which had been under heavy UNITA attack, and claimed to have seized a significant quantity of UNITA military equipment.

11. At the same time, the government forces opened a front in Uíge and Zaire provinces, which are considered key areas in view of the large concentration of UNITA troops there and the importance of Maquela do Zombo as a logistic support base. According to reports, government forces are attempting to dislodge UNITA elements from these areas, and along the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

12. FAA launched another offensive southwards from Luena in order to capture UNITA elements attempting to regroup in Moxico province near the Zambian border. According to government sources, a significant number of UNITA troops surrendered with heavy weapons in that area. FAA also captured Savate, a locality in southern Cuando Cubango province, and is pursuing its offensive in the south-eastern part of the country. In this process, the government forces subsequently gained control of key localities such as Lucusse, Cangamba, Lumbala-N'guimbo and Cuangar, and a large number of UNITA troops, including officers, reportedly surrendered or were taken prisoners. With the support of Namibian security forces, FAA reportedly also captured Jamba in the same province, thus consolidating its position and gaining almost total control of the southern border. According to the press, Namibian security forces sealed the border in the Caprivi Strip to prevent the retreat of UNITA fighters into Namibian territory. Recently, several civilians were killed in the area, presumably by UNITA forces. It should be noted that military operations on the eastern and southern Angolan borders have spilled into neighbouring Zambia and

Namibia where, in addition to the refugee influx, bombing and shelling incidents have been reported on both sides of the border areas.

13. FAA's intensive military campaign in the central highlands and the eastern region has put additional pressure on UNITA forces which, as a result, are resorting to guerrilla warfare. FAA claimed to have captured or destroyed more than 40 per cent of UNITA's conventional forces and to have located the whereabouts of Mr. Savimbi. For its part, the UNITA leadership claimed to have undertaken a strategic withdrawal from Bailundo, together with heavy equipment, and to have re-established its headquarters at Sautar, 200 kilometres east of Andulo.

14. Meanwhile, security conditions have reportedly improved in the north-eastern region of Angola. The city of Malanje was secured by FAA after a long siege by UNITA. Road traffic has resumed from Malanje to the Cuango basin, despite UNITA's sporadic ambushes on government military convoys. In Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces, the main diamond mining areas are under the protection of FAA and private security companies are rendering the roads relatively safe. UNITA activities have been limited to banditry and attacks by small groups of fugitives from the central highlands. Most areas in Cuanza Sul province and the southern region have also enjoyed a relatively long period of calm. In Cuanza Sul, UNITA's attacks and ambushes have decreased considerably since the FAA offensive started in the central highlands. Road traffic in the traditionally affected Luanda-Sumbe-Lobito stretch is relatively safe. Since the FAA's successful offensive in the northern part of Huíla province, security conditions have also improved in the area. However, some FAA elements were recently accused by local non-governmental organizations of perpetrating human rights abuses, including killings of villagers suspected to be UNITA sympathizers in Lunda Sul and Malanje provinces.

IV. HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

15. The intensification of military operations and the still precarious security conditions throughout the country have been accompanied by reports of human rights abuses. However, since the United Nations has no access to most parts of Angola, little information is available about the treatment of the civilian population or others hors de combat in the areas formerly controlled by UNITA that were recently captured by government forces. Nor is there much confirmed information about the abuses perpetrated by UNITA that are frequently reported by the press. It appears, however, that various military elements, including UNITA, have been responsible for the looting of crops and destruction of property.

16. The intensification of the conflict and the re-establishment of government authority in the areas previously held by UNITA, have triggered a debate among members of Angolan society on ways to promote the democratization process in the country. In this connection, the Human Rights Division (HRD) of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) has pursued its activities in close cooperation with the Government, State institutions and civil society. By the end of 1999, several capacity-building projects had been developed in cooperation between the United Nations and various government ministries, State

institutions, non-governmental organizations and professional associations that are being implemented in collaboration with the Irish non-governmental organization Trocaire and with the support of donor countries. The system of judiciary and law enforcement in Angola suffers from a lack of human and material resources, low salary levels, outdated laws and a lack of proper training. The HRD projects have therefore been focused on the training of prosecutors and judges, on improvement of infrastructure, on public access to law and court proceedings, and on the need for law reform. However, a United Nations training project of the police still awaits approval of the authorities. At the same time, a prison programme of HRD has addressed legal issues and conditions of detention. The need for such a programme is underscored by cases of detainees who have been awaiting trial for up to four years under severely inadequate conditions since they were arrested. The HRD projects also include the training of Angolan human rights counsellors and support to Angolan lawyers.

17. Since the relocation of all MONUA personnel to Luanda in early 1999, the HRD has had to discontinue its activities outside the Angolan capital, except in Benguela province where it has set up human rights centres. In addition, HRD has carried out assessment missions in Sumbe (Cuanza Sul province) and Huambo, and has recently visited several other provinces to identify new projects for expanded operations. Meanwhile, the Government has also identified six provinces for priority human rights activities in 2000.

18. While the joint efforts of HRD, the Government and civil society continue to contribute to the strengthening of the rule of law, the challenges in this area remain daunting. Freedom of expression has come under considerable pressure and journalists have been subjected to legal proceedings, especially when they report on issues considered to be sensitive. In a case widely covered by the press, an Angolan journalist, Rafael Marques, was arrested on 16 October 1999, detained incommunicado for several days and then held in pre-trial detention before being released on bail. While such incidents have resulted in increased self-censorship, the media and some civil groups have nevertheless continued to be outspoken on a range of important issues, including activities of groups opposed to the war, corruption, economic mismanagement, forced military conscription and the need for dialogue and reconciliation. It is obvious that the overall situation in the country could only benefit from an improved human rights environment and from persistent efforts to eliminate human rights violations.

V. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

19. The humanitarian situation in the country remains precarious as a result of continued military activities, with widespread insecurity in several regions of Angola and disruptions in the rehabilitation of social and economic structures and services. The war-affected civilian population is estimated to be 3.7 million people, of whom nearly 2 million are internally displaced persons (IDPs). Angola's ranking in the human development index fell from 156 in 1998 to 160 in 1999. Forty-two per cent of children under 5 years of age are either severely or moderately underweight and, if they survive, are likely to develop health problems later. Agricultural production for the year 2000 will not be satisfactory for the population.

20. The humanitarian status of one third of the Angolan population, living in inaccessible areas, remains unknown. It is expected that the extension of State administration in the areas formerly controlled by UNITA would facilitate access to all vulnerable populations. Improving conditions in these areas would represent a major challenge to the Government of Angola and the international community.

21. The security situation has seriously constrained international humanitarian work in Angola. Humanitarian agencies have been compelled to rely on expensive air transport to reach provincial capitals, but are often not able to venture to locations outside these capitals. Landmine incidents have dramatically increased in recent months. Between January and November 1999, 409 civilians, mostly women, on their way to or from their fields, fell victim to landmines. Mine clearance has been curtailed since donors suspended their assistance to this programme owing to the state of war. Yet, it is of critical importance that international support be extended to such programmes, in order to ensure the safe resumption of agricultural and commercial activities. Failure to do so would only penalize innocent people. The funding requirement of the 2000 United Nations Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal for Angola amounts to $258 million. It is hoped that the donor community will respond generously to the appeal.

VI. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

22. During the last quarter of 1999, serious macroeconomic difficulties continued to affect the Angolan economy, resulting in the deterioration of all key economic indicators. By November, the annual rate of inflation had reached 335.3 per cent, while the value of the national currency still declined, despite the Government's efforts to merge the official and parallel exchange rates. The recent increase in oil prices is a positive development for the country; but, with the continuation of the conflict, an increasingly large proportion of national resources are obviously diverted to the war effort. The 1999 Human Development Report[1] indicated that, during the period of relative peace witnessed in Angola from 1996 to 1998, the human development index had registered an upward trend but, with the resumption of the war, it declined slightly.

23. As a result of the resumption of the conflict in December 1998, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), like other United Nations programmes and agencies, had to scale down its operational activities. Two major UNDP programmes were discontinued, in particular support to the reintegration of ex-combatants and vocational training for demobilized soldiers. A third nationwide programme, the Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation, had to be refocused to concentrate on secure areas of the country. In view of the increasing number of landmine incidents, UNDP has pursued its advocacy role in support of the continuation of the mine action programme, focusing on mine awareness campaigns and data-collection processing.

24. While, as indicated above, some programmes had to be curtailed, new initiatives were launched by UNDP to assist the Government in addressing severe problems, including the alarming number of IDPs. In particular, UNDP initiated a new project to support the reintegration of vulnerable groups in selected

vinces, in order to help bridge the gap between relief, reconstruction and elopment activities. In addition, UNDP intends to continue to assist the ernment in the implementation of long-term development projects. In this ard, UNDP proposed the 1999 National Human Development Report, focusing on role of civil society in improving human development.

VII. ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS

In line with the intention expressed by the Angolan Government to acquire e MONUA assets, President dos Santos and my former Special Representative for gola established a joint commission to oversee the liquidation of the Mission. llowing a meeting of the joint commission on 13 March 1999 and further lengthy gotiations, the Government made an offer to the United Nations on 11 November purchase MONUA assets amounting to approximately $8.3 million. This offer s reaffirmed on 6 December 1999. Prior to completing the sale, the Government quested a reverification of the assets and associated paperwork. This process now in the final stage and the sale of MONUA assets to the authorities should completed by the end of January 2000.

. With regard to issues related to the two United Nations aircraft (UN806 and 806A) that were shot down in the central region of Angola in December 1998 and nuary 1999, MONUA representatives met with the Angolan military authorities in ambo on 17 December 1999 to coordinate the return of United Nations teams to e crash sites, taking into account the security situation in this area. greement was reached for a reconnaissance team to be dispatched to both sites ring the course of this month.

VIII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

. The General Assembly, by its resolution 53/228 of 8 June 1999, appropriated amount of $7.4 million for the liquidation of MONUA for the period from July 1999 to 30 June 2000. I also obtained authorization from the Advisory mmittee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to enter into commitments in amount of $5.3 million to meet additional resources associated with the tention of both military and civilian personnel beyond the originally ojected deadlines for withdrawal and liquidation. I intend to seek propriation and assessment of this additional amount from the Assembly during s resumed fifty-fourth session. As at 31 December 1999, unpaid assessed ntributions to the MONUA special account amounted to $91.3 million. The total tstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date mounted to $1.5 billion. With regard to requirements relating to the stablishment of UNOA, I have since also obtained funding for its requirements rough 15 April 2000 in the context of the programme budget.

IX. OBSERVATIONS

. The protracted conflict in Angola and the risks of spillover into the eighbouring countries remain a source of major concern for the international mmunity. Obviously, UNITA bears the primary responsibility for the current

state of affairs. Its refusal to comply with obligations under the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex), in particular its failure to demilitarize its forces and to allow State administration to be extended throughout the country, precipitated the resumption of widespread hostilities.

29. Following a major military offensive throughout the country in recent months, the Angolan Government has gradually re-established its authority in areas formerly controlled by UNITA, including the latter's strongholds in the central highlands. As a result, some measure of stability has been achieved in several regions.

30. However, the humanitarian situation, which affects a growing number of vulnerable people, remains extremely alarming. It is very much hoped that the extension of State administration to areas formerly occupied by UNITA will facilitate access to all populations in need. I urge the donor community to respond as generously as possible to the 2000 United Nations Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal for Angola. At the same time, the democratization process and observance of human rights will remain essential steps for the normalization of life in the country and the pursuit of an effective national reconciliation process.

31. I earnestly hope that the draft Status-of-Mission Agreement can be concluded without further delay, so that UNOA may begin to assume its functions, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1268 (1999) of 15 October 1999. Meanwhile, the Secretariat is finalizing the selection of the Head and support staff of UNOA. At the same time, as Council members are aware, I have appointed Mr. Ibrahim Gambari of Nigeria as my Special Adviser on Africa, with special focus on Angola among other issues.

32. Ultimately, only a political solution can help to restore durable peace and security in Angola. In this spirit, I welcome the recent indication by the Angolan authorities that the Lusaka Protocol remains a valid basis for the peace process. I strongly urge UNITA to demonstrate convincingly that it is prepared to fulfil its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol and to seek genuine national reconciliation. It is hoped that the evolving situation in Angola may offer new opportunities to initiate an inclusive dialogue leading to the lasting peace and national reconciliation that the suffering Angolan people have aspired to for so long. The United Nations would welcome such a development and would be ready, if the parties so wished, to play an active role in furthering this process.

Notes

[1] New York, Oxford University Press for the United Nations Development Programme, 1999.

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NINTH REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (MINURCA)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 8 of its resolution 1271 (1999) of 22 October 1999, the Security Council requested me to submit by 15 January 2000 a report on the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) and, in particular, on the progressive transfer of the functions of MINURCA in the security field to the local security and police forces, on the evolution of the situation in the Central African Republic, on the progress achieved in the implementation of the commitments set forth in the letters dated 8 December 1998 (S/1999/116, annex) and 23 January 1999 (S/1999/98, annex) from the President of the Central African Republic addressed to the Secretary-General, and on the implementation of the Bangui Agreements (S/1997/561, appendices III-VI) and the National Reconciliation Pact (S/1998/219), including the commitments relating to economic recovery, the restructuring of the security forces and the functioning of the Special Force for the Defense of the Republican Institutions (FORSDIR).

2. The present report is submitted in accordance with paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1271 (1999). It describes developments in the Central African Republic since early October 1999.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

3. Since my eighth report to the Council on 7 October 1999 (S/1999/1038), political developments in the Central African Republic have been dominated by the investiture of President Ange-Félix Patassé to a second term as the Head of State and by the formation of the new Government under the reappointed Prime Minister, Anicet Georges Dologuélé.

4. In spite of the confirmation by national and international observers that the presidential election of 19 September 1999 was transparent and credible, the opposition lodged a petition with the Constitutional Court challenging the election's results. Under article 90 of the Electoral Code, the Constitutional Court was expected to hand down a decision within 60 days after the petition was filed. However, since the Court did not do so within the stipulated period, it

now seems that the issues raised regarding the conduct of the presidential election can be regarded as closed.

5. Prime Minister Dologuélé's efforts to form a broad-based Government triggered an extensive discussion within the ruling party, Mouvement de libération du peuple centrafricain (MLPC). Some MLPC members, who had aspired for cabinet posts, threatened to vote against the Prime Minister's programme of action when it was presented to the National Assembly. However, in the end, the National Assembly voted for the Government's programme of action on 25 November 1999. The result of the vote was 59 in favour and 49 against with 1 abstention.

6. The aims of the Government's programme of action include the restructuring of the country's security forces and the creation of a multi-ethnic national security institution capable of carrying out its constitutional functions in a democratic setting. Expansion in the economic sector is also envisaged, in particular in agriculture, mining and tourism. The programme offers several proposals for urgently needed fiscal reforms, particularly in the critical area of revenue generation. The Government set a new revenue target of 70 billion CFA francs, though it is now felt that this target may have been overly optimistic.

7. An important aspect of the programme of action is the consolidation of democracy and the strengthening of democratic institutions, particularly the links between the Central Government and provincial institutions. The programme provides for a process of gradual devolution of powers and functions to the provinces with a view to making them active participants in the task of nation-building. Among other socio-economic priorities of the Government are the improvement of the management of national enterprises, the fight against poverty, the improvement of the living conditions of the people, commitment to resume the regular payment of salaries to all civil servants and military personnel, the development of transport and communications infrastructures and the promotion of national unity. While the Government has reaffirmed its commitment to the programme of action, its implementation will obviously require considerable resources, including international assistance. In this connection, the role of the international community will remain crucial.

Transition to post-conflict peace-building

8. In my letter of 3 December 1999 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1999/1235), I reported on the outcome of the United Nations multidisciplinary mission that visited Bangui from 15 to 19 November 1999. The Mission held talks with the Central African authorities on the conditions for the maintenance of a United Nations presence after the expiration of MINURCA's mandate on 15 February 2000.

9. The Central African authorities had expressed their wish that the Security Council extend the mandate of MINURCA until the end of December 2000 to address the outstanding internal security challenges and the looming subregional threats. However, they have acquiesced to the reality of MINURCA'S current phased withdrawal and are taking the necessary steps in the security area. The

United Nations is working closely with the Government to ensure a smooth transition from peacekeeping to the post-conflict peace-building phase.

10. As I indicated in my letter of 3 December 1999, the primary task of the United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) would be to support the Government's effort to consolidate peace and national reconciliation, to strengthen democratic institutions and to facilitate the mobilization of international assistance for national reconstruction and economic recovery. The mobilization of external assistance to the Central African Republic will be done in close collaboration with United Nations agencies, in particular with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which will support the preparation of the proposed round table of donors. BONUCA would have a few civilian police experts, who would continue to provide advice and training for the Central African police and gendarmerie, as well as a few military advisers to provide technical assistance to the Government's efforts to restructure its armed forces. A human rights section would continue to monitor developments and promote public awareness of human rights issues.

Implementation of the Bangui Agreements and the National Reconciliation Pact

11. The Government of the Central African Republic, with support from MINURCA and United Nations programmes and agencies, continued its efforts to implement the Bangui Agreements and the National Reconciliation Pact, which form the basis for peace and stability in the country.

12. In a spirit of national unity, Prime Minister Dologuélé appointed several cabinet members from civil society and opposition parties, including from General André Kolingba's Rassemblement démocratique centrafricain (RDC), Jean-Paul Ngoupandé's Parti de l'unité nationale (PUN) and Enoch Dérant Lakoue's Parti social démocrate (PSD).

13. Although the restructuring of the armed forces is a vital part of the reforms envisaged under the Bangui Agreements, it was not until May 1999 that special legislation was enacted to set in motion the process which would include the demobilization and reintegration of former soldiers. However, the implementation of the programme has been held back, partly because of a lack of resources. The Government hopes to obtain international support in financing the programme, including through the donor meeting that I have proposed to convene in the near future. In the meantime, the Government has taken steps towards the reintegration of some ex-mutineers in the armed forces, as called for in the Bangui Agreements. It has also made partial payments in settlement of salary arrears to civil servants and military personnel, as well as of the outstanding scholarships to students.

14. However, other important elements of the Bangui Agreements, such as the modification of some procedures under the Penal Code, the regulation of access to the University of Bangui, the revision of certain articles in the Constitution and the negotiation of a social pact with the trade unions, are yet to be implemented.

15. At the same time, a number of provisions of the National Reconciliation Pact have been implemented. These include the Family Code, the establishment of

a National Population Commission, the independence of the judiciary and the privatization of public enterprises such as the Union bancaire en Afrique centrale (UBAC) and Société des eaux en centrafrique (SODECA). The Government has started the privatization process of the management of the Société d'énergie centrafricaine (ENERCA) and the full privatization (both capital and management) of Société centrafricaine de télécommunications (SOCATEL). One item under the National Reconciliation Pact, the creation of a Social and Economic Council, has not been implemented, and there is still no clear indication as to whether the Government has any plans to that effect.

Public information

16. During the reporting period, Radio MINURCA continued to play a crucial role in promoting the understanding of the Bangui Agreements and Security Council decisions among the people of the Central African Republic. Particular attention in this regard was given to the withdrawal of MINURCA and the progressive transfer of its functions to the Government structures. United Nations radio programmes have contributed significantly to public awareness on the issues of human rights. United Nations specialized agencies and programmes such as UNDP, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), have used the radio programmes extensively to disseminate information about their activities in the country. Consultations are under way with a view to transferring the relevant equipment of Radio MINURCA to Freetown for use by the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

III. HUMAN RIGHTS

17. The Government continues to declare its commitment to the promotion of human rights. It has appointed a national High Commissioner for Human Rights and is actively participating in seminars organized by MINURCA'S human rights component. However, the authorities are still unable to put an end to the use of extrajudicial methods in dealing with problems concerning breaches of law and order. The killings at Kembe and in the Kembe-Grimari area on 18 November 1999 by heavily armed men, suspected to be security elements, were grim indications that more needs to be done before respect for human rights can be firmly institutionalized in the country. In this context, MINURCA has raised its concerns with the relevant authorities regarding FORSDIR's continued involvement in law enforcement functions. Such involvement would be a violation of the constitution and the laws on the restructuring of the Central African armed forces.

18. Conditions at the national detention centres remain below minimum standards and the lack of a penitentiary in the capital has contributed to the deplorable overcrowding of the detention facilities in police stations. A chronic lack of resources in the judicial and law enforcement systems has also contributed to the poor treatment of detainees.

19. It is pertinent to mention that during the reporting period 50 gendarmes completed the United Nations human rights course organized to train national trainers. In addition, human rights programmes on Radio MINURCA, broadcast in

French and Sango, continued to put special emphasis on various human rights activities in the Central African Republic.

20. At the same time, a series of promotional activities, including essay-writing contests, a televised debate and three theatre presentations, were organized to commemorate the fifty-first anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 1999. A special ceremony to mark the occasion was also held under the auspices of the newly appointed national High Commissioner for Human Rights.

IV. MILITARY AND SECURITY ASPECTS

Military activity

21. The military and security situation in Bangui and the environs has remained relatively calm. A spate of violence was however reported in the Kembe region in the south-east of the country following the assassination of Lieutenant Antoine Bodo, the region's Assistant Military Commander, on 17 November 1999. Government forces succeeded in reasserting authority in the Kembe region and the rebels were dislodged. In the process, some casualties occurred, most of which were reportedly blamed on elements of FORSDIR who stormed the area. Though the security situation in Kembe has stabilized, the inquiry set up by the Government is yet to determine who was responsible for the assassination of Lieutenant Bodo.

Transfer of security functions from the Mission to the Government

22. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1271 (1999), MINURCA has been coordinating all its actions closely with the Central African authorities in order to ensure a progressive transfer of its security functions to Government security and police forces. The first four United Nations infantry companies were repatriated from Bangui by mid-December 1999. On 29 December, elements of the Central African gendarmerie, police and armed forces began to take over the duties previously carried out by MINURCA military contingents, including the patrolling of Bangui's first, fourth, seventh and eighth arrondissements. The Central African authorities have also created a Mixed General Command comprising the police, gendarmerie and army elements to facilitate the transfer of security functions and to coordinate with MINURCA on relevant matters. The second drawdown of MINURCA will take place shortly and Government forces are expected to take over from MINURCA the security functions in the second, third, fifth and sixth arrondissements of the city before the end of January.

23. In the meantime, the four long-awaited bills on the restructuring of the armed forces have been promulgated and the Government has begun to take measures for their implementation. With regard to the statutory functions of FORSDIR, a decree has been issued indicating that the force shall be constituted drawing from various sections of the armed forces and shall be restricted to the defence of republican institutions; its command and direction shall remain within the purview of the Chief of Staff of the Central African armed forces. The decree also stipulates that authority and control hitherto exercised by the Director-General of the Force will be taken over by the Chief of Staff of the armed

forces. However, additional concrete steps need to be taken in order that FORSDIR be truly restricted to the duties ascribed to the security forces under the constitution. Such a transformation continues to be crucial as the country moves towards the strengthening of peace and national reconciliation.

Civilian police

24. The civilian police component of MINURCA has made a considerable effort to achieve the four objectives set out in the mandate: namely, the training of national personnel; reinforcement of the capacity of the police force; provision of technical advice for restructuring; and assistance in the electoral process. So far, 569 Central African police officers and 402 officers in the gendarmerie have received from the United Nations initial or supplementary training on law enforcement. The civilian police component has also contributed significantly to increasing awareness and respect for human rights.

Disarmament and disposal of weapons

25. It may be recalled that MINURCA had kept custody of two categories of weapons, those collected by the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) during the disarmament of former mutineers in the Central African armed forces in 1996 and 1997 and, more recently, those surrendered by Congolese soldiers retreating to the Central African Republic. At the request of the Central African authorities, and in view of the pressing needs for the restructuring of the security forces of the Central African Republic, MINURCA formally handed over the serviceable weapons to the Government on 5 and 8 January 2000.

26. The Government agreed that the 466 light arms and 56 heavy weapons collected from mutineers will be used exclusively for arming the new defence and security forces to be established in the framework of the restructuring efforts. All unserviceable weapons in MINURCA custody were destroyed on 11 January 2000, at a symbolic public event. The Government undertook to inform the United Nations of the progress made in the restructuring of the armed forces and the use of the weapons for this purpose. At the same time, the Government agreed that the 3,328 light arms collected from Congolese troops will be transferred to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with the concurrence of the United Nations, when the situation in that country stabilizes.

V. ECONOMIC ASPECTS

27. In November 1999, a joint World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) assessment team visited Bangui. The team was not satisfied with the overall performance of the Central African economy, particularly in the critical area of revenue generation. However, the team promised to return in February 2000, to make a reappraisal of the situation in the light of new commitments made by the Government in the area of fiscal reforms. It should be noted that during the reporting period the Government increased domestic petroleum prices to reflect higher international prices. Furthermore, it contracted the Société générale de surveillance (SGS) and mandated it to issue customs certificates specifying payments to the Treasury prior to actual payment of the customs dues. Based in

part on the progress in privatization (see para. 29 below) and on the strong commitment in the area of revenue generation, the World Bank approved a fiscal consolidation of SDR 14.4 million on 16 December 1999.

28. On 5 January 2000, the Governments of France and the Central African Republic signed a development assistance agreement in the amount of CFA francs 3.2 billion for the Bangui water canal project and the improvement of the Société d'énergie centrafricaine (ENERCA). Also at the beginning of the year, the Government of Nigeria sent five specialists to Bangui to assist in educational planning.

29. In the area of privatization, the Banque internationale pour la Centrafrique (BICA) is now fully privatized. In the case of the Union bancaire en Afrique centrale (UBAC), a Cameroon-based consortium is slated to purchase 51 per cent of the shares in the privatized venture, 39 per cent has been reserved for purchase by the citizens of the Central African Republic, while the Government is expected to get the remaining 10 per cent of shares.

30. As regards PETROCA, the State-owned petroleum company, the company is still under the control of the liquidators. The final take-over by the prospective owners, the companies Elf and Total, has been delayed owing to disagreement over the prices to be charged to consumers. The Government is wary of enacting any steep increase in the prices because of the obvious effect on other essential services, as well as the possible social consequences. Taxi and bus operators have already gone on strike in Bangui for several days to protest the Government's freeze on fares charged to commuters. It was with great difficulty that the Government was finally able to resolve the pump price issue.

VI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

31. The General Assembly, by its resolution 53/238 of 8 June 1999, appropriated and assessed an amount of $33.4 million for the operation and administrative closing of MINURCA for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000. In addition, I have obtained authorization from the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in the amount of $6.7 million to cover the costs associated with the supportive role that MINURCA has been authorized to play in the conduct of presidential elections in the Central African Republic. In this connection, I intend to seek from the General Assembly, during its resumed fifty-fourth session, appropriation and assessment of these additional requirements, as well as of the resources related to the extension of the Mission's mandate pursuant to Security Council resolution 1271 (1999). As at December 1999, unpaid assessed contributions to the MINURCA special account amounted to $36.9 million. Outstanding loans totalling some $17 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund and a closed mission to finance MINURCA's operational requirements have yet to be repaid. For this reason, it has thus far only been possible to pay troop costs to all MINURCA troop-contributing countries only up to the end of November 1998. With regard to the trust fund for the support of activities of MINURCA, contributions as at 31 December 1999 totalled $0.87 million, with expenditures authorized in the full amount of contributions received. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $1,482.1 million.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

32. As a result of the expressed wish of the Security Council and subsequent discussions with the United Nations, it appears that the Central African authorities have accepted the prospects of MINURCA's withdrawal on 15 February 2000, even though they would have wished to delay the drawdown of the Mission until December 2000.

33. In this connection, I received a letter from the President of Algeria and current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Abdelaziz Bouteflika, dated 27 December 1999, in which he expressed his concern over the possible consequences of MINURCA's withdrawal on the security and stability in the Central African Republic. President Bouteflika urged the United Nations to reconsider its decision to allow the newly elected Government of President Patassé time to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of conflict in the country. In my response to President Bouteflika, dated 12 January 2000, I noted that the Security Council had intended to terminate MINURCA's mandate by 15 November 1999, but that under resolution 1271 (1999) it had extended the Mission to 15 February 2000, bearing in mind the positive developments in the Central African Republic and the need to ensure a seamless transition to peace-building. I stressed that consolidation of the progress made in the Central African Republic with United Nations support would, to a large extent, depend on the determination of the parties, particularly the Government, to honour their commitments and on the continued support of the international community.

34. By successfully conducting two national elections and the ongoing reforms, the people and Government of the Central African Republic have already demonstrated their strong commitment to democracy and peaceful development. While a great deal has been accomplished towards these goals, much remains to be done. It is obvious that the restructuring of the security and armed forces will not be fully completed by the time of MINURCA's withdrawal. The sizeable number of Central African police and gendarmes who have been trained by MINURCA still lack the resources and equipment necessary to ensure security in the country. At the same time, the Central African Republic remains vulnerable to the volatile situation in the subregion, in particular the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo. Security concerns in Bangui have decreased somewhat following the voluntary repatriation of military elements from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the relocation of refugees to rural sites. It should be noted, however, that some 50,000 refugees from neighbouring countries remain in the Central African Republic and require international attention and support. As the Government has emphasized on many occasions, the crisis in the Central African Republic is rooted, to a considerable extent, in the poverty and economic deterioration of the country. These are areas that continue to need particular assistance of the international community.

35. As at 15 February 2000, BONUCA will take over from MINURCA to provide assistance in the peace-building effort. The Secretariat, in coordination with UNDP and the Programme on Demobilization and Reintegration of the Central African Government, have already initiated consultations with external partners in preparation for the proposed donor conference to raise funds for the restructuring and demobilization programmes. Notwithstanding the above, it

remains primarily for the Central Africans themselves to strengthen the democratic institutions in the country, to broaden the scope for reconciliation and national unity and to intensify the implementation of the programmes designed to accelerate economic recovery. Obviously, the people of the Central African Republic and their leaders deserve to be congratulated for what they have achieved so far.

36. Through their presence and active role in the Central African Republic, MINURCA, its predecessors and MISAB have provided the people and Government of the Central African Republic with much needed stability and breathing space after a period of serious upheaval that threatened to unravel any prospects of developing its economy and society. The consistent backing of the international community, as well as MINURCA's dissuasive presence and firmness in curbing threats to the country's stability, were essential for the holding of legislative and presidential elections and the launching of major political, social and economic reforms. It should also be borne in mind that these positive developments took place as the wider Central African region was engulfed in violent conflict. Important challenges still lie ahead for the Central African Republic. Accordingly, as the United Nations withdraws its peacekeepers from the country, the Government of the Central African Republic will need to do its utmost to build on the gains made during MINURCA's presence and continue to work resolutely towards genuine democracy and economic recovery.

37. Lastly, I should like to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Oluyemi Adeniji, who left Bangui for Sierra Leone on 11 December 1999, where he has been reassigned as my Special Representative, to the Force Commander and current officer-in-charge of MINURCA, Major General Barthélémy Ratanga (Gabon), and to all the military and civilian personnel of the Mission, as well as to the United Nations agencies and programmes and to donor countries, including the Friends of the Central African Republic, for their significant contribution to the progress made in the country thus far.

Annex

United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic: contributions as at 6 January 2000

Country	Staff observers	Support unit	Troops	Total
Côte d'Ivoire	10	15	209	234
Egypt	8	184	120	312
Gabon	4[a]	-	1	5
Senegal	9	-	119	128
Chad	6	-	114	120
Total	37	199	563	799[b]

[a] Includes the officer-in-charge of the Mission.

[b] In addition to 16 civilian police observers from Benin (2), Cameroon (1), France (2), Mali (6), Senegal (3) and Tunisia (2).

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S/2000/25
14 January 2000

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LETTER DATED 14 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have been instructed by my Government to lodge a strong protest over the hideous crimes listed below and to request that the United Nations security and civil presences in Kosovo and Metohija, the autonomous province of the Yugoslav constituent Republic of Serbia, take all necessary measures to put an end to the killing, harassment and ethnic cleansing of non-Albanians and to create a secure environment in this Serbian province in full implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999.

1. At 1.00 a.m. on 11 January 2000, the terrorists of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) cut off power supply and telephone lines in Kosmajska Street of the Prizren city quarter of Tusus and killed four members of the Muslim family of Skenderi: Adriana, born in 1980, Hanifa, born in 1941, Sezair, born in 1941, and Djula, born in 1917. At 8.00 a.m. on 13 January, looking for Ajmir Skenderi, son of late Hanifa and Sezair, the Albanian terrorists killed two other members of the family, Ajmir's two twin sisters and Hanifa's and Sezair's daughters. The crime has caused fear among the Muslims and other non-Albanians in the Prizren area who are protesting this latest instance of violence of the so-called KLA.

2. On 29 December 1999 a body of a dead man was found in the village of Obljevik, Municipality of Vucitrn. The investigation has indicated that the person had been killed a week before the body was found.

These monstrous crimes provide telling evidence that the terrorists of the so-called KLA continue to kill and ethnically cleanse non-Albanians despite the presence of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK) in this Serbian province. Their tolerant attitude towards Albanian terrorists amounts to fawning to Albanian terrorist separatism and complicity in most grievous crimes committed in the full glare of the international community.

These crimes also bring to light the responsibility of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and UNMIK head for the difficult security situation in Kosovo and Metohija due to his failure to respect his mandate and to implement Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and

the related documents. Except for routine verbal condemnations of the violence, the Special Representative and UNMIK head has done nothing to put an end to this abhorrent practice even though he has over 50,000 KFOR and UNIP members and other United Nations and international organizations personnel at his disposal. The escalation of killing and harassment of non-Albanians and the ensuant difficult security situation in Kosovo and Metohija provides convincing evidence that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, many members of the Security Council and the objective international public opinion have been right in highlighting the failure of KFOR and UNMIK ever since the beginning of their deployment to implement the mandate entrusted them by the Security Council in its resolution 1244 (1999) and to create a secure environment for all residents of this Serbian province.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIC
Chargé d'affaires a.i.